








In recent years, proponents of configurational comparative methods (CCMs)
have advanced various dimensions of robustness as instrumental to model
selection. But these robustness considerations have not led to computable
robustness measures, and they have typically been applied to the analysis of
real-life data with unknown underlying causal structures, rendering it
impossible to determine exactly how they influence the correctness of
selected models. This article develops a computable criterion of fit-robustness,
which quantifies the degree to which a CCM model agrees with other models
inferred from the same data under systematically varied threshold settings of fit
parameters. Based on two extended series of inverse search trials on data
simulated from known causal structures, the article moreover provides a
precise assessmentof the degree towhich fit-robustness scoring is conducive to
finding a correct causal model and how it compares to other approaches of
model selection.
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Introduction
Different methods of causal data analysis tend to track different features of
causal structures, exploit different markers in empirical data for their infer-
ence to causation, or define causation along the lines of different theories of
causation. These differences must be taken into account when benchmarking
the issued models. This holds notably for model robustness. What it means
for a model to be robust depends on what the corresponding method’s aims
and purposes are. More concretely, the models of a method aiming, say, to
quantify effect sizes on the population level must meet different robustness
criteria than the models of a method aiming to capture difference-making
relations on the case level. It follows that different criteria are needed for
different methods. While some methodological frameworks have long tradi-
tions of robustness benchmarking, others do not. A framework of the latter
type is the one of configurational comparative methods (CCMs; see, e.g.,
Baumgartner and Ambühl 2020; Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser 2009; Ragin
2008; Thiem 2014b), where discussions about robustness have begun only
recently. The goal of this article is to contribute to the ongoing development
of robustness benchmarks custom-built for the aims and purposes of CCMs.
The most widely employed robustness measures are the ones of causal
discovery methods using statistical techniques. Such methods, as regression
analysis (e.g., Gelman and Hill 2007) or Bayes-nets methods (e.g., Spirtes,
Glymour, and Scheines 2000), rely on probabilistic or counterfactual theories
of causation (e.g., Lewis 1973; Suppes 1970), they track causal dependencies
between random variables (e.g. “X is a cause of Y”), and, most importantly,
their models are built to reflect average or marginal effect sizes or net effects
in the whole data. Their models count as robust only if they remain invariant
across repeated re-analyses of the data under subsampling, measurement
error introduction, or variation of tuning parameters. CCMs, by contrast, rely
on regularity theories of causation (e.g., Mackie 1974), they track causal
dependencies between specific values of variables (e.g., “X¼w is a cause
of Y¼g”), they analyze conjunctural causation and equifinality (i.e., not
marginal effect sizes) and—following the template of Mill’s method of
difference—their models are intended to reflect difference-making relations
on the level of individual cases in the data. More concretely, if the data
contain cases that vary in exactly one of the analyzed factors as well as in
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the outcome, while all other factors remain constant, CCMs take this as
evidence for the causal relevance of a value of the varying factor.1 Therefore,
adding, subtracting, or recoding a few cases, say, due to varying tuning
parameters or measurement error introduction, frequently amounts to alter-
ing difference-making evidence, which then induces changes in CCM mod-
els. As CCM models are expressly built to reflect cross-case variation,
robustness measures that reward model invariance miss the very aim of
CCMs.
Nonetheless, some authors have recently benchmarked CCM models
against statistical robustness standards (e.g., Hug 2013; Krogslund, Choi,
and Poertner 2015). The results are seemingly devastating for CCMs, as their
models typically do not meet these standards to an acceptable degree. But
that finding, rather than yielding a meaningful estimate of the robustness of
CCM models and demonstrating their unreliability, as Hug (2013) and Krog-
slund et al. (2015) submit, merely exhibits that a robustness measure reward-
ing invariance is at cross purposes with CCMs.
A lot of variance in CCM models is completely benign. It simply reflects
varying amounts of inferentially exploited difference-making evidence with-
out implying any inconsistent causal conclusions. Two different models are in
no disagreement if the causal claims entailed by them stand in a subset relation,
that is, if one of them is a submodel of the other. In that case, the submodel
merely recovers the data-generating structure less completely than the super-
model. But given the massive fragmentation of data commonly analyzed by
CCMs, CCMs cannot normally be expected to uncover data-generating struc-
tures in their entirety anyway. Importantly, CCM models only make claims
about causal relevance, not about causal irrelevance. If a factor value X¼w
does not appear in a model of an outcome Y¼g, it does not follow that X¼w is
causally irrelevant to Y¼g but only that the data do not contain evidence for the
relevance of X¼w (Baumgartner and Ambühl 2020).
However, not all variance in CCM models is of the benign kind. For
example, it regularly happens that data entail many different models that are
not submodels of one another, giving rise to model ambiguities (Baumgart-
ner and Thiem 2017). Criteria are needed that select among such unrelated
models. Or, maximizing the two core parameters of model fit, namely, con-
sistency and coverage, tends to induce CCMs to expand resulting models by
irrelevant factor values, prompting overfitting and corresponding false posi-
tives (see the section Overfitting; Arel-Bundock 2019). Strategies are needed
to avoid that pitfall. Hence, there is a need for distinguishing benign from
non-benign model variance and, more generally, for complementing
existing criteria of model selection by additional constraints. Robustness
Parkkinen and Baumgartner 3
standards—properly adapted to the purposes of CCMs—are straightforward
candidates to fill that bill.
Indeed, in recent years, proponents of CCMs have advanced various
dimensions of robustness as instrumental to model selection (e.g., Cooper
and Glaesser 2016; Schneider and Wagemann 2012:§11.2; Skaaning 2011).
But these discussions have typically revolved around concrete real-life data
sets with unknown underlying causal structures.2 In consequence, it is not
possible to determine to what degree existing CCM robustness considera-
tions are conducive to selecting correct models, avoiding overfitting, or
reducing model ambiguities. Moreover, while there are numerous concrete
illustrations qualitatively comparing different model candidates with respect
to their robustness, there currently exist no computable robustness measures
for CCMs.3
This article develops a computable criterion of fit-robustness that is tailor-
made for CCMs by measuring the degree to which a model’s causal ascrip-
tions overlap with the causal ascriptions of other models inferred from the
same data under systematically varied fit thresholds. More specifically, our
operationalization of robustness involves two steps: First, the set of all mod-
els M for given data d is built by re-analyzing d under systematically varied
consistency and coverage thresholds; second, the robustness of a particular
model mi 2M is expressed in terms of the total number of sub- and super-
models mi has among the elements of M. The more sub- and supermodels mi
has in M, the more mi overlaps in causal ascriptions with other models
inferred from d, the higher mi’s robustness score. By systematically varying
other tuning parameters in the first step, analogous criteria of, say, calibra-
tion-robustness or frequency-robustness could be developed. For reasons of
space, we focus on varying consistency and coverage only—which, after all,
are the two dominant CCM criteria of model selection. Furthermore, for
reasons of generality and computational flexibility, we will use Coincidence
Analysis (CNA) as our CCM of choice. While Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA)—the best known CCM—only imposes consistency thresh-
olds and comes with a search protocol for structures with single outcomes
only, CNA accepts both consistency and coverage thresholds and can also
analyze multi-outcome structures.
This article is organized as follows. The second section reviews the con-
ceptual preliminaries of our argument. In the third section, we demonstrate
the need for complementing existing criteria of model selection by a robust-
ness criterion, whose details are presented in the fourth section. The fifth
section benchmarks that criterion under a range of discovery conditions. We
conclude in the sixth section. The Online Supplementary Material provides
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detailed R-scripts that supply an explicit R function operationalizing our
robustness scoring and allow for replicating our benchmark tests along with
all other calculations of this article.
Preliminaries
We begin by introducing the notation and the relevant concepts used in our
ensuing discussion. CCMs study Boolean dependence relations between
variables taking on specific values. In the CCM literature, variables are
typically referred to as factors. Factors represent categorical properties that
partition sets of units of observation (cases) either into two sets, in case of
binary properties, or into more than two (but finitely many) sets, in case of
multi-value properties. Factors representing binary properties can be crisp-
set (cs) or fuzzy-set (fs); the former (typically) take on 0 and 1 as possible
values, whereas the latter can take on any (continuous) values from the unit
interval ½0; 1. Factors representing multi-value properties are called multi-
value (mv) factors; they can take on any of an open (but finite) number of
non-negative integers as possible values.
For simplicity of exposition, we will subsequently illustrate our robust-
ness account with examples featuring binary factors only. This allows us to
conveniently abbreviate the explicit “Factor¼value” notation. As is conven-
tional in Boolean algebra, we write “A” for A¼1 and “a” for A¼0. While this
shorthand simplifies the syntax of models, it introduces a risk of misinter-
pretation, for it yields that the factor A and its taking on the value 1 are both
expressed by “A.” Disambiguation must hence be facilitated by the concrete
context in which “A” appears. Accordingly, whenever we do not explicitly
characterize italicized Roman letters as “factors,” we use them in terms of the
shorthand notation. Moreover, we write “AB” for the conjunction “A¼1 and
B¼1,” “Aþ B” for the disjunction “A¼1 or B¼1,” “A! B” for the implica-
tion “If A¼1, then B¼1” (aþ B), and “A$ B” for the equivalence “A¼1 if,
and only if, B¼1” (ABþ ab).
Based on the implication operator, the notions of sufficiency and necessity
are defined, which are the two Boolean dependence relations exploited by
CCMs: X is sufficient for Y if, and only if (iff), X ! Y (“if X is given, then Y
is given”), and X is necessary for Y iff Y ! X (“if Y is given, then X is
given”). As Boolean dependencies amount to mere patterns of co-
occurrence, they carry no causal connotations whatsoever and, hence, mostly
do not reflect causal relations. Still, some of them do. So-called regularity
theories of causation are designed to filter out those sufficiency and necessity
relations that do track causation. They accomplish this by imposing a
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rigorous non-redundancy constraint (Baumgartner and Falk 2019; Graßhoff
and May 2001; Mackie 1974). Only minimally sufficient conditions con-
tained in minimally necessary conditions track causation, where sufficient
and necessary conditions are said to be minimal iff they do not comprise
sufficient and necessary proper parts.
CNA models can be atomic or complex, representing single-outcome and
multi-outcome structures, respectively. An atomic model has the form
F$ Y , where Y is an endogenous factor value (Y¼g) and F stands for a
minimally necessary disjunction of minimally sufficient conditions in dis-
junctive normal form (DNF),4 such that all factors in that DNF are different
(and logically and conceptually independent) from one another and from Y.
An atomic CNA model explains an endogenous factor value Y in terms of a
redundancy-free DNF of exogenous factor values. A complex CNA model is
a redundancy-free conjunction of atomic models of the form
ðF1 $ Y1Þ . . . ðFn $ YnÞ.
Since configurational data d tend to feature various deficiencies, such as
measurement error or confounding, expressions of type F$ Y that strictly
adhere to the equivalence operation (“$“) often cannot be inferred from d.
To relax the equivalence standards, Ragin (2006) introduced the fit para-
meters of consistency and coverage into the QCA protocol, which have
subsequently also been imported into CNA (Baumgartner and Ambühl
2020). Informally put, consistency reflects the degree to which the behavior
of an outcome obeys a corresponding sufficiency or necessity relationship or
a whole model, whereas coverage reflects the degree to which a sufficiency
or necessity relationship or a whole model accounts for the behavior of the
corresponding outcome. The parameters take values from the unit interval,
with 1 representing perfect consistency and coverage. What counts as accep-
table scores on these parameters is defined in threshold values determined by
the analyst prior to the application of CNA. The models meeting the chosen
thresholds are output by CNA along with their specific consistency and cov-
erage scores. The product of a model’s consistency and coverage scores, that
is, its con-cov product, is interpreted as a measure for its overall model fit.
To clarify the causal interpretation of CNA models, consider the follow-
ing complex exemplar:
ðAbþ aB$ CÞ  ðCf þ D$ EÞ: ð1Þ
Functionally put, (1) claims that the presence of A in conjunction with the
absence of B (i.e., b) as well as a in conjunction with B are two alternative
minimally sufficient conditions of C (relative to the chosen consistency
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threshold) and that Cf and D are two alternative minimally sufficient
conditions of E. Moreover, both Abþ aB and Cf þD are claimed to
be minimally necessary for C and E (relative to the chosen coverage thresh-
old). Against the background of a regularity theory, these functional relations
can be causally interpreted as follows: (i) The factor values listed on the left-
hand sides of “$” are directly causally relevant for the factor values on the
right-hand sides; (ii) A and b are located on the same causal path to C, which
differs from the path on which a and B are located, and C and f are located on
the same path to E, which differs from D’s path; and (iii) Ab and aB are
two alternative indirect causes of E whose influence is mediated on a causal
chain via C.
Importantly, CNA models are to be interpreted relative to the data d from
which they have been inferred and to the threshold settings chosen for that
inference. That is, (1) does not purport to be a complete representation of the
causal structure behind d. (1) only details those causally relevant factor
values along with those conjunctive, disjunctive, and sequential groupings
for which d contain evidence at the chosen threshold settings. In particular,
(1) does not exclude that some further factor value G might not also be
causally relevant for C or E; (1) only entails claims about causal relevance,
not about causal irrelevance. By extension, another CNA model, such as (2),
inferred from d relative to, say, lower consistency and/or coverage thresholds
does not conflict with model (1).
ðA þ B $ CÞ  ðC þ D $ EÞ: ð2Þ
(2) identifies A and B as alternative direct causes of C and indirect causes
of E, moreover C and D are claimed to be alternative direct causes of E. All
of this also follows from (1). The causal claims entailed by (2) thus constitute
a subset of the claims entailed by (1), meaning that (2) is a submodel of (1).
As the submodel relation will be of core relevance for our ensuing argument,
we define it in all explicitness here.
Submodel Relation. A CCM model mi is a submodel of another CCM model mj
if, and only if,
1. all factor values causally relevant according to mi are also causally
relevant according to mj,
2. all factor values contained in two different disjuncts in mi are also
contained in two different disjuncts in mj,
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3. all factor values contained in the same conjunct in mi are also con-
tained in the same conjunct in mj,
4. if mi and mj are complex models, all atomic components m
k
i of mi have





If mi is a submodel of mj, mj is a supermodel of mi. All of mi’s causal
ascriptions are contained in its supermodels’ ascriptions, and mi contains the
causal ascriptions of its own submodels. The submodel relation is reflexive:
Every model is a submodel (and supermodel) of itself; or differently, if mi and
mj are submodels of one another, then mi and mj are identical. Most impor-
tantly, even if two models related by the submodel relation are not identical,
they do not disagree or conflict in their causal ascriptions; rather, they can be
interpreted as describing the same causal structure with varying granularity.
Overfitting
Numerous authors (e.g., Braumoeller 2015; Krogslund et al. 2015; Lucas and
Szatrowski 2014) have argued that CCMs have a dangerous tendency to
incorporate causally irrelevant factors in their models, thereby committing
too many false positive errors. Representatives of CCMs (e.g., Baumgartner
and Thiem 2020; Rohlfing 2015; Thiem and Baumgartner 2016) have found
various flaws and overgeneralizations in these arguments and have shown
that CCMs work reliably for data conforming to the high-quality standards
imposed by CCMs, in particular, the homogeneity of the unmeasured causal
background.5 Still, the fact remains that CCMs run a serious false positive
risk when these quality standards are not met (Arel-Bundock 2019; Baum-
gartner and Ambühl 2020), in particular, when the data comprise cases
incompatible with the data-generating causal structure over the set of mea-
sured factors, meaning cases that, subject to that structure, should not exist.
Such case incompatibilities can have different sources, for instance, mea-
surement error or confounding. For brevity, we will subsequently often sim-
ply say that case incompatibilities are due to noise.
Of course, noise has a negative effect on the output quality of any method,
but for CCMs, this effect is especially high when the data have small sample
size and the analyst is maximizing the model fit, that is, consistency and
coverage. To illustrate this problem, consider the data in Table 1A, which
have been simulated from the very simple causal structure in (3) and one
added irrelevant factor D.
Aþ BC $E: ð3Þ
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More specifically, Table 1A is the result of, first, collecting one case instan-
tiating each of the 16 configurations of the factors A, B, C, D, and E compa-
tible with (3) and, second, replacing one case in these clean and complete
Table 1. Effect of Random Error.
A)
Case A B C D E
c1 0 0 0 1 0
c2 0 0 1 1 0
c3 1 1 1 1 1
c4 1 1 1 0 1
c5 1 1 0 1 1
c6 0 1 0 1 0
c7 0 0 1 0 0
c8 1 0 0 1 1
c9 0 1 1 0 1
c10 0 1 1 1 1
c11 1 1 0 0 1
c12 0 0 0 0 0
c13 1 0 0 0 1
c14 0 1 0 0 0
c15 1 0 1 1 1
c16 1 0 1 0 0
B)
# Models Con Cov Thresholds Correct
1 Acþ ADþ BC $ E 1.00 1.00 h1:00; 1:00i O
2 Acþ BC $ E 1.00 0.89 h1:00; 0:85i O
3 ABþ ADþ BC $ E 1.00 0.89 h1:00; 0:85i O
4 ADþ BC $ E 1.00 0.78 h1:00; 0:75i O
5 ABþ Acþ AD$ E 1.00 0.78 h1:00; 0:75i O
6 Aþ BC $ E 0.90 1.00 h0:85; 1:00i P
7 Aþ B$ E 0.75 1.00 h0:75; 1:00i P
8 Aþ CD$ E 0.80 0.89 h0:75; 0:85i O
9 A$ E 0.88 0.78 h0:75; 0:75i P
Note: The third column indicates the thresholds at which a model is found and the fourth
whether a model is a submodel of (3) (and thus only makes correct causal claims).
(A) features data generated from (3) by introducing measurement error on case c16. (B) lists the
coincidence analysis models (and their fit scores) resulting from re-analyzing (A) with system-
atically lowered consistency and coverage thresholds.
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data by a case that is incompatible with (3). The incompatible case, c16, is
highlighted with gray shading. The only difference between the original case
and c16 is that the latter features E¼0 where the former had E¼1, meaning
that this case incompatibility can be thought of as resulting from noise on the
outcome E.
Case c16 is incompatible with (3) because it does not feature the outcome E
even though one of its causes in (3), A, is given. In light of c16, therefore, A
cannot be identified as sufficient cause of E, meaning that, when processing
Table 1A at maximal consistency and coverage thresholds of h1; 1i, CNA (or
QCA) will not recover (3). Instead, CNA will attempt to conjunctively comple-
ment A by further factor values in order to reach perfect consistency. Indeed,
there exist two further factor values in combination with which A is strictly
sufficient for E in Table 1A: Ac and AD. It turns out, moreover, that disjunc-
tively combining these two conditions with BC to Acþ ADþ BC yields
perfect coverage. Accordingly, when CNA (or QCA) is run at h1; 1i, it outputs
model 1 in Table 1B (see the replication script for details). But, of course, given
that (3) represents the ground truth, model 1 falsely ascribes causal relevance to
c and D, which in fact are irrelevant.
Although not recovered at h1; 1i, the data-generating structure (3) is a
proper submodel of the model with maximal fit. And indeed, if the fit
thresholds are lowered, CNA infers a whole array of further models from
Table 1A, some of which are simpler than the best fitting model. Table 1B
lists all models recovered when fit thresholds are systematically lowered
from 1 to 0.75 at increments of 0.05. Some of these models yield false
positives, but some exclusively entail causal claims that are correct accord-
ing to the ground truth (3), namely, models 6, 7, and 9. Model 6, which is
returned at a threshold setting of h0:85; 1i, is identical to (3), while models 7
and 9 are proper submodels of (3).6 This shows that the false positives
entailed by the model with maximal fit result from overfitting. When
requested to maximize fit, CNA builds a disjunction comprising both irre-
levant factor values and an irrelevant path. When the fit thresholds are
relaxed, adding these additional factor values and the irrelevant path is
no longer required to meet the thresholds, the overfitting disappears, and
correct models are returned.
That CCMs fall prey to overfitting in the presence of only one single
incompatible case is not some rare idiosyncrasy of Table 1A; rather, it is a
commonplace phenomenon in small sample sizes.7 For CNA, the prevalence
of overfitting can be demonstrated using the function cnaOpt() from the
cnaOpt R-package (Ambühl and Baumgartner 2020), which purposefully
builds models with maximal fit for the processed data. In what follows, we
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hence conduct a series of trials to determine the ratios of trials in which
overfitting occurs by applying cnaOpt() to data sets with increasing sample
sizes and increasing shares of incompatible cases. We again choose (3) as our
ground truth and generate data from this structure relative to the factors A, B,
C, D, and E; 16 configurations of these factors are compatible with (3). Let
did be the ideal data consisting of 16 cases, each of which instantiates another
one of these 16 compatible configurations. In a first series of trials, we
alternatively replace 1, 2, and 3 randomly drawn cases in did by randomly
drawn cases that are incompatible with (3), which yields increasing incom-
patibility shares (or noise ratios) of 6.25 percent, 12.5 percent, and 18.75
percent, respectively. In a second series, we double the case frequency
resulting in 32 cases and again randomly replace 6.25 percent, 12.5 percent,
and 18.75 percent compatible by incompatible cases. We repeat the same
procedure for data sets of 48, 64, and 80 cases, thus multiplying the case
frequency of did by 3, 4, and 5. In each trial, we check whether the models
generated by cnaOpt() are overfitted. The overfitting ratio for each trial is
calculated based on 1,000 repetitions of the trial.
The results are plotted in Figure 1. It can easily be seen that they are
damning for small sample sizes. At the base frequency of one case per com-
patible configuration, a single incompatible case leads to false positives due to
overfitting in 38 percent of the trials. An incompatibility share of 12.5 percent,
that is, two incompatible cases at n ¼ 16, pushes the overfitting ratio up to 67
percent, and at 18.75 percent incompatibilities, overfitting occurs in 80 percent
of the trials. In larger sample sizes, the overfitting risk decreases. For instance,
if the sample size and the number of case incompatibilities are multiplied by a











Figure 1. Overfitting ratios when processing data simulated from the target struc-
ture (3) with increasing sample sizes and increasing shares of randomly drawn
incompatible cases. Each overfitting ratio is a mean over 1,000 executions of a trial.
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and with even larger sample sizes, the overfitting risk becomes more and more
negligible. Still, it is indisputable that the overfitting risk for small sample sizes
is unacceptably high. After all, even in small samples—where it is common
CCM practice not to select cases randomly but based on background theories
and all available case knowledge (Schneider and Wagemann 2012)—the com-
plete absence of incompatible cases can hardly ever be guaranteed in the
disciplines in which CCMs are most often applied.
The obvious conclusion to draw is that when analyzing small-sized
noisy data, maximizing consistency and coverage is not a reliable strat-
egy of model selection. This finding conflicts with certain methodologi-
cal recommendations in the CCM literature. Ragin (2008:46), for
instance, suggests that “[i]n general, consistency scores should be as
close to 1.0 (perfect consistency) as possible”; or Schneider and Wage-
mann (2012:128) recommend that consistency thresholds be placed the
higher, the lower the number of cases under investigation. However, in
actual CCM practice, fit thresholds are often simply set to non-maximal
bounds given by conventions, typically some values between 0.85 and
0.75; and in the example of Table 1A, such a conventional threshold
placement avoids the overfitting problem. At h0:75; 0:75i, a model is
returned, namely, A$ E, that merely assigns causal relevance to A,
which is true according to the data-generating structure (3).8 Clearly
though, the conventional threshold placement avoids the overfitting prob-
lem at the price of not revealing as much of the structure behind
Table 1A as could possibly be revealed, for at h0:85; 1i, the entire ground
truth is correctly recoverable from Table 1A. In other words, A$ E is
not informative enough; it is not over- but underfitted.
Overall, in noisy discovery contexts, CCM model fit (just as model fit in
other frameworks) should neither be maximized, to avoid overfitting, nor
minimized, to avoid underfitting. Hence, the question arises how to identify
threshold settings yielding models that are as revealing as possible about the
ground truth without inducing false positives. In simulations, where the data-
generating structure is presupposed, that question is easily answerable by re-
analyzing the data at varying threshold settings and identifying the setting at
which the (known) ground truth is recovered. But, of course, real-life dis-
covery contexts are characterized by the data-generating structure being
unknown, which makes it impossible to determine which among all tested
threshold settings actually recovers the truth. To alleviate that problem, the
next section introduces a criterion of fit-robustness that helps to identify the
models that can be trusted among all the models returned by CCMs within
the range of acceptable threshold settings.
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Robustness
Searching for robust models to avoid over- and underfitting is an
approach that comes easily to mind. But, as we have seen in the intro-
duction, we cannot simply draw on statistical robustness measures
rewarding model invariance under varying re-analyses of the data.
Instead, we propose to understand the robustness of a CCM model in
terms of the degree to which its causal attributions are contained in and
contain the causal attributions of all the other models obtained from a
series of data re-analyses under varying consistency and coverage set-
tings. Rather than rewarding invariance, robustness in that sense rewards
those models that are most closely interrelated with the other models
from that re-analysis series and it punishes models making idiosyncratic
causal attributions.
Before we flesh out that sketch, let us clarify the aims and limitations
of our proposal. Robustness testing is a heuristic for model selection in
noisy discovery contexts. If there is enough noise, especially if it is
patterned or biased, any method will misfire sooner or later. But CCMs,
as we have seen in the previous section, are particularly vulnerable
through even mild degrees of noise. The purpose of a robustness measure
for CCMs must be to reduce that vulnerability, without being expected to
erase it altogether or to work equally well in all noise scenarios; it is only
one tool for vulnerability reduction among others. In that light, the aim
of our proposal shall be to improve the overall model quality in the
presence of randomly distributed noise. The robustness measure sketched
above can be expected to achieve that purpose because if measurement
error is not biased and there is no systematic confounding (and there is
not so much noise that CCMs abstain from drawing inferences alto-
gether), the signal stemming from actual causal dependencies will, on
average, be stronger in the data than spurious associations due to noise.
In consequence, elements of the ground truth will be included in many
models obtained at varying threshold settings, whereas spurious factor
values will only be included in models inferred at specific consistency
and coverage thresholds. That may not hold in biased and patterned noise
scenarios. Thus, the next section will put the performance of our
approach to the test under both random and non-random noise.
We now render our robustness measure precise on the basis of the sub-
model relation introduced in the section Preliminaries, which directly mirrors
containment relations among causal attributions of CCM models. If two
models are related in terms of the submodel relation, at most one of them
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makes causal attributions not made by the other one, such that the model with
fewer attributions remains silent about the other model’s additional attribu-
tions. By contrast, if two models are not related by the submodel relation,
they both entail some causal attributions not entailed by the other model.
That is, the more sub- and supermodels a model mi has in a given set of
models, the more mi’s causal attributions overlap with the causal attributions
of the other models in that set; conversely, the fewer the sub- and super-
models of mi, the more idiosyncratic mi’s causal attributions. We thus pro-
pose to measure the fit-robustness of mi inferred from data d by re-analyzing
d under systematically varied consistency and coverage settings and collect-
ing all models returned in that re-analysis series in a set M. The fit-robustness
of mi can then be expressed in terms of the total number of sub- and super-
models mi has in M.
This approach requires first producing a set M of models inferable
from d under systematically varied fit thresholds. The resulting robust-
ness scoring is relative to the composition of M, which, in turn, depends
on two parameters: the scanned interval of threshold values and the
granularity of the threshold variation. If we scan the interval ½0:8; 1,
M typically only contains a proper subset of the models that result from
scanning the interval ½0:7; 1. Likewise, if we vary the consistency and
coverage settings at increments of 0.1, less models tend to be recovered
than if the settings are varied at a finer granularity of, say, 0.05. When
combined, the scanned interval ½h; k and the variation granularity l
define a re-analysis type, which we simply denote by the tuple
h½h; k; li. For example, the type h½0:8; 1; 0:1i scans the interval from
consistency and coverage thresholds of 0.8 to 1 at increments of 0.1.
When performed on a data set d, a re-analysis type yields a re-analysis
series consisting of m analyses of d each of which is performed at a
unique combination of consistency and coverage cutoffs. m is the number
of two-element variations (with repetitions) of the sequence given by the
interval and the granularity. More concretely, the type h½0:8; 1; 0:1i
induces testing all two-element variations of the sequence
f0:8; 0:9; 1:0g, which amounts to m ¼ 9. Or differently, the re-analysis
series performing that type tests the following consistency and coverage
threshold pairs: h0:8; 0:8i, h0:9; 0:8i, h1; 0:8i, h0:8; 0:9i, h0:9; 0:9i,
h1; 0:9i, h0:8; 1i, h0:9; 1i, and h1; 1i.9 Collecting all models returned in
the course of a re-analysis series results in a set of models M for d
relative to h½h; k; li. Taken together, these considerations yield the fol-
lowing notion of fit-robustness:
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Fit-robustness (FR). Given a set of models M produced by a re-analysis series
performing the re-analysis type h½h; k; li on data d, the fit-robustness of
model mi 2M relative to h½h; k; li is the number of sub- and supermodels
mi has in M.
Before we illustrate (FR)-based robustness scoring with a concrete exam-
ple, two features of (FR) must be emphasized. First, (FR) provides a notion of
robustness that is relative to a re-analysis type h½h; k; li. In this sense, (FR) is
analogous to statistical robustness measures based on random re-sampling or
measurement error introduction or to the Akaike information criterion. Just
as results of statistical robustness tests based on re-sampling from observed
data may vary depending on the number of samples taken, (FR) may return
different scores when different re-analysis types are performed. Analogously
to the Akaike information criterion, the (FR) score of a model mi is mean-
ingful only in comparison to other models inferred from the same data with
the same re-analysis type. That is, (FR) does not yield a notion of absolute fit-
robustness that would make models built in different re-analyses series
mutually comparable. Rather, (FR) renders the models in M comparable
with respect to their robustness relative to the performed re-analysis
type—it exclusively serves the purpose of selecting among the models in M.
Second, (FR) strikes a balance between overly complex and overly simple
models. To show this, we use the number of exogenous factor values in a
model as measure of its complexity. If mi has more exogenous factor val-
ues—that is, higher complexity—than another model mj, mj cannot be a
supermodel of mi. Hence, models with high complexity tend to have less
supermodels in M than models with low complexity. At the same time, they
are likely to have more submodels because models with less exogenous
factor values cannot have submodels with higher complexity. As (FR) takes
sub- and supermodels equally into account, a model can score high on
robustness by having many submodels or many supermodels. This scoring
is independent of the model’s complexity. Its robustness depends entirely on
whether its elements are returned at many or only at few consistency and
coverage thresholds. (FR) punishes complex and simple solutions alike if
they make idiosyncratic causal attributions.
Let us now look at a concrete example of (FR)-based robustness scoring.
To this end, we revisit the nine models inferred from Table 1A by performing
the re-analysis type h½0:75; 1; 0:05i using CNA. Table 2 lists them again, in
the same order as in Table 1B (we do not repeat their consistency and
coverage scores). Scanning the threshold interval ½0:75; 1 at increments of
0.05 requires m ¼ 36 different threshold settings each executed by a separate
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CNA run. Many of these runs produce the same models, meaning that the
models in Table 2 are returned multiple times at different threshold settings.
Model 4, for instance, is returned at the following settings: h1; 0:75i,
h0:95; 0:75i, and h0:90; 0:75i. That is, Table 2 does not list individual model
tokens produced in a particular CNA run but unique model types produced
across the whole re-analysis series. For transparency, we add the column “t”
indicating how many tokens (or instances) of a particular model (type) were
recovered in the whole series. In this example, the set of all models M
produced in the series contains a total of 50 tokens, nine of which are
instances of model 1, nine of model 2, and so on.
The columns “Submodels” and “Supermodels” of Table 2 exhibit which
models in M are sub- and supermodels of a particular model. For example,
model 4 has the submodels 4, 6, 7, and 9 and the supermodels 1, 3, and 4. As
detailed in section Preliminaries, every model is both a sub- and a supermodel
of itself, which is why every model is listed in both of these columns (in the
rows) corresponding to itself. The columns “Scoreraw” and “Scorenorm” pro-
vide the raw and normalized fit-robustness scores for each of the models.
To see how these scores are calculated, consider model 4. It has model 6
as a submodel, of which there are 10 instances in M, meaning it receives 10
robustness points from model 6. Model 7 with five instances is another
submodel of model 4, hence, supplying another five points. Or, model 1 with
nine instances is a supermodel adding nine points to the score. When it comes
to counting the sub- and supermodel relations a model bears to itself, we only
Table 2. Relisting of the Models in Table 1B.
# Models t Submodels Supermodels Scoreraw Scorenorm
1 Acþ ADþ BC $ E 9 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 1 46 0.87
2 Acþ BC $ E 9 2, 6, 7, 9 1, 2 43 0.81
3 ABþ ADþ BC $ E 6 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 3 31 0.59
4 ADþ BC $ E 3 4, 6, 7, 9 1, 3, 4 37 0.70
5 ABþ Acþ AD$ E 3 5, 7, 9 5 12 0.23
6 Aþ BC $ E 10 6, 7, 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 53 1.00
7 Aþ B$ E 5 7, 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 51 0.96
8 Aþ CD$ E 2 8, 9 8 5 0.09
9 A $ E 3 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 51 0.96
Note: Column “#” labels the (types of) models, “t” indicates how many times a model is
recovered by the re analysis type h½0:75; 1; 0:05i performed on Table 1A, “Submodels” and
“Supermodel” display the sub- and supermodels of a model, “Scoreraw” and “Scorenorm” their raw
and normalized robustness scores.
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count different tokens of the model. That is, we subtract two points from the
sub- and supermodel relations obtaining among the individual tokens of a
model, reflecting the fact that a model token is both a sub- and a supermodel
of itself. In total, model 4 has ð10þ 5þ 3þ 9þ 6þ 3þ 3Þ  2 ¼ 37
different token sub- and supermodels in M. More generally, if we denote
the sets of sub- and supermodel tokens of model mi by subi and supi,
respectively, the raw robustness score of mi is simply the sum of the cardin-
alities of subi and supi minus 2:
scorerawðmiÞ ¼ jsubij þ jsupij  2: ð4Þ
It is evident that, depending on the data and the performed re-analysis
type, scorerawðmiÞ may vary greatly. The raw fit-robustness of mi, when mi
is inferred from data d or by performing h½h; k; li, is not comparable to the
score of the same model mi when it is inferred from a different d’ or by
performing a different re-analysis type h½h 0; k 0; l 0i. By normalizing the raw
scores, we make explicit that fit-robustness is relative to the set M of all
models obtained in a re-analysis series. More concretely, the normalized
measure scorenormðmiÞ amounts to mi’s raw score divided by the maximum
raw score obtained by a model in M. Hence, if M ¼ fm1; . . . ;mng, normal-
ized fit-robustness is this:
scorenormðmiÞ ¼
scorerawðmiÞ
maxðscorerawðm1Þ; . . . ; scorerawðmnÞÞ
: ð5Þ
The overall fit-robustness scoring for our example has various notable
features. First, model 1, which has the highest consistency and coverage (cf.
Table 1B), does not have the highest (FR) score, meaning that (FR) scores do
not align with fit. In other words, (FR) is an additional criterion of model
selection over and above consistency and coverage. Second, the (FR) score is
independent of model complexity. There are complex and simple models
with high as well as with low (FR) scores, which corroborates that (FR) has
no built-in preference for more or less complex/informative models. Third,
the frequency at which a model is returned, while important, is not the sole
determinant of the (FR) score and may not even be the decisive one. In the re-
analysis series of our example, model 6 is the most frequent one, being
returned in 10 of the 36 analyses, and also has the highest (FR) score. But
it is clear that frequency alone is not driving the results: The second most
frequent models, 1 and 2, are both returned nine times and lose in (FR) score
to model 7, returned five times, and to model 9, returned only three times.
Fourth, all three models with highest fit-robustness—6, 7, and 9—avoid
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causal fallacies, as all their causal claims are correct according to the ground
truth (3). That means true causal dependencies receive higher (FR) scores
than spurious ones. What is more, the highest scoring model, model 6,
exactly corresponds to the causal structure (3) used to simulate the data in
Table 1A. Thus, (FR) succeeds in selecting the ground truth among all
generated models, thereby avoiding both under- and overfitting.
Plainly, though, this example was purposefully selected to introduce and
illustrate (FR) on a simple test case. What is needed next is an assessment of
whether (FR) achieves its intended purpose when applied to examples not
selected for introductory purposes and simplicity, that is, to randomly drawn
examples. This is the topic of the next section.
Benchmarking
We extensively benchmarked (FR)-based robustness scoring to determine,
first, whether it indeed improves the overall quality of CCM models in
discovery contexts featuring random noise and, second, how it fares in con-
texts with non-random noise. This section reports our results. We first discuss
the general setup of our tests and then detail the specifics and results of the
tests with random and non-random noise, respectively. We executed all tests
both on crisp-set and fuzzy-set data. For brevity, our subsequent discussion
focuses on the crisp-set tests, which, overall, turned out to be less favorable to
(FR)-based robustness scoring. The results of the fuzzy-set tests are pre-
sented in the Online Appendix. The Online Supplementary Material more-
over supplies separate replication scripts for all tests.
General Test Setup
To determine whether selecting models based on high (FR) scores improves
or diminishes the overall model quality, we contrast it with standard model
selection approaches. More specifically, we process data by means of CNA
and select sets S of models using the following four approaches: The first,
which we label FRscore, selects the models with highest (FR) scores result-
ing from the re-analysis type h½0:7; 1; 0:1i; the second, MaxFit, selects the
models with the highest products of consistency and coverage (con-cov
products) generated by the maximal consistency and coverage setting in the
interval [0.7, 1] actually producing a model; the third, Conv0.8, selects the
models with highest con-cov products generated at the conventional thresh-
old setting h0:8; 0:8i; and the fourth, Conv0.75, selects the models with
highest con-cov products generated at the conventional setting
18 Sociological Methods & Research XX(X)
h0:75; 0:75i. In the selected sets S of top-scoring models, we do not merely
include the models with maximal (FR) scores and con-cov products, respec-
tively, but the models at or above the 98th percentile of (FR) scores and con-
cov products.
To determine the quality of the selected models in S, we have to com-
pare them with the ground truth, meaning we have to know the data-
generating causal structures. As these are typically unknown in real-life
data, we run our tests on simulated data. More specifically, we conduct
inverse searches, which reverse the order of normal causal discovery. An
inverse search comprises three main steps: (1) a causal structure D is drawn
(as ground truth), (2) data d are simulated from D, featuring varying defi-
ciencies (e.g., different types of noise), and (3) d is processed by the
benchmarked method in order to check whether its output meets a tested
benchmark criterion.
We test the model sets S against three increasingly stringent benchmark
criteria: first, whether S is fallacy-free; second, whether S contains a correct
model; and third, to what degree correct models in S completely reflect the
ground truth. A set S is fallacy-free iff it does not entail a causal claim that is
false of the ground truth D (i.e., no false positive). Clarifying when S satisfies
that condition calls for some preliminary remarks on the phenomenon of
model ambiguities.
It is a frequent phenomenon in all methodological frameworks that
empirical data underdetermine their own causal modeling to the effect that
multiple models account for them equally well (e.g., Baumgartner and Thiem
2017; Eberhardt 2013; Spirtes et al. 2000:59-72). In cases of such ambigu-
ities, CCMs output all data-fitting models (and leave the disambiguation up
to the analyst). It follows that, if a CCM issues multiple models, it is not
thereby implying that all of these models correspond to the ground truth but
only that (at least) one of them does, and that—based on the available
evidence—it is undetermined which one exactly. The same holds if one of
FRscore, MaxFit, Conv8.0, or Conv0.75 selects multiple models, that is, if
S ¼ fm1;m2; . . . ;mng with n > 1. Such a result is to be interpreted dis-
junctively: The data-generating structure is:
m1 OR m2 OR ::: OR mn:
A disjunction is true iff at least one disjunct is true; and conversely, it is
false iff all disjuncts are false. Hence, in order for a set of models S to be
fallacy-free, it must not be the case that all models in S are false. This can
be satisfied in two ways: Either (i) S is empty (e.g., because chosen fit
Parkkinen and Baumgartner 19
thresholds cannot be met) or (ii) S contains at least one model mi that is
correct of the ground truth D, which is the case iff mi is a submodel of D. So,
S satisfies our first benchmark criterion iff it satisfies conditions (i) or (ii).
The reader may wonder why we test a benchmark that can, in principle, be
passed by a trivial method producing empty outputs by default. The reason
is that such a method would be entirely uninformative, which would be
visible in its failing our third, completeness, benchmark; but an empty
output produced by a method that does not fail on completeness is a valu-
able piece of information entailing that the data do not warrant any causal
conclusions. The capacity to abstain from drawing causal inferences when
no such inferences are warranted is a crucial methodological asset that
deserves to be benchmarked.
In light of that specification of fallacy-freeness, our second benchmark
criterion is straightforwardly clarified. It focuses on non-empty sets S
only and checks whether condition (ii) is satisfied, meaning whether S
actually contains at least one model mi that is a submodel of D, and thus
correct. That is, while an empty set S passes the first benchmark, it does
not pass the second.10
Finally, our third benchmark criterion addresses the fact that the cor-
rectness of a model does not entail anything about its informativeness. In
other words, of two different models that are both submodels of the
ground truth D, one can be more complex than the other and, hence,
reveal D more completely. It is clear that the more complete correct model
is preferable. Hence, of two approaches that select correct models equally
reliably, the one whose selected models are more complete, on average, is
preferable. The completeness benchmark measures the degree to which the
correct models in S exhaustively reveal D. More specifically, the comple-
teness criterion amounts to the ratio of the complexity of the most com-
plex correct model in S to the complexity of D, where complexity of a
model is, again, understood as the number of exogenous factor values
contained in it.11 That is, contrary to the first and second benchmarks,
which can only be passed or not, the third benchmark can be passed by
degree.
Random Noise
In a first series of tests, we compare the performance of FRscore, MaxFit,
Conv0.8, and Conv0.75 on the above benchmarks when the analyzed data
feature randomly distributed noise, meaning randomly drawn cases incom-
patible with the ground truth. That performance depends on various
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parameters, such as the complexity of the ground truth, the sample size, or
the noise ratio. To vary these parameters (to some degree), we set up 12
different test types simulating data d from randomly generated ground
truths D comprising values of some (not necessarily all) of the crisp-set
factors in F ¼ fA;B;C;D;E;Fg. The 12 test types differ insofar as each of
them realizes one logically possible variation of the following parameters:
(1) number of outcomes in D, with a variation between one and two out-
comes; (2) sample size multiplier, with a variation between one and three
(i.e., one and three cases per configuration); and (3) ratio of cases in d
replaced by cases incompatible with D, with a variation between 0.05,
0.15, and 0.25. For transparency, the 12 test types are listed and numbered
in Table 3. In test 6, for example, we generate ground truths D with two
outcomes and simulate data d from each of them by, first, generating an
ideal data set did comprising one case per configuration and by, second,
replacing 15 percent of the cases in did by randomly drawn cases incompa-
tible with D. Importantly, in all of these tests, each case of did has equal
probability of being replaced by an incompatible case and all incompatible
cases have equal probability of being drawn.
One particular test trial, that is, one instance of a test type, consists in a
data set simulated according to the parameters of that type being sequentially
processed by FRscore, MaxFit, Conv0.8, and Conv0.75. The resulting four
sets of selected models are then benchmarked for fallacy-freeness, correct-
ness, and completeness. To get a statistically reliable performance








1 1 1 0.05
2 2 1 0.05
3 1 3 0.05
4 2 3 0.05
5 1 1 0.15
6 2 1 0.15
7 1 3 0.15
8 2 3 0.15
9 1 1 0.25
10 2 1 0.25
11 1 3 0.25
12 2 3 0.25
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assessment, we run 1,000 trials of each test type, yielding a total of
12 1; 000 ¼ 12; 000 trials. The bar chart in Figure 2 plots the correspond-
ing benchmark scores for the four selection approaches averaged over all
12,000 trials.
These averaged results show that, across all different D complexities,
sample sizes, and ratios of incompatible cases, FRscore significantly outper-
forms the other approaches on the correctness benchmark. While only
including 1.38 models in S per trial, on average, FRscore finds a correct
model in 69 percent of the trials. The other approaches include over 1.45
models in S, which comprises a correct model in only 56 percent (Conv0.75),
44 percent (Conv0.8), and 46 percent (MaxFit) of the trials. FRscore also
scores highest on completeness, which demonstrates that the correct models
singled out by FRscore are not less informative than the models issued by the
other approaches. At the same time, the overall low completeness scores
indicate that, in the presence of up to 25 percent of cases incompatible with
D, CNA can only uncover a little over a third of D—which, roughly, corre-
sponds to the completeness restrictions Arel-Bundock (2019) has recently
exhibited for QCA. Finally, FRscore likewise has an edge over the other
approaches on the fallacy-freeness benchmark, which, to recall, can be
passed either by a correct or by an empty output. FRscore avoids a causal
fallacy in 80 percent of the trials (with 11 percent empty outputs), as opposed





















Figure 2. Benchmark scores averaged over all 12,000 trials of the random-noise test
series. The top-right table provides the average number of models per trial selected
by an approach.
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percent empty) by Conv0.8, and 58 percent (12 percent empty) by MaxFit.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Benchmark scores broken down by the ratio of cases incompatible with D
(top), the sample size multiplier (middle), and the number of outcomes in D (bottom).
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conventional threshold settings is manageable, maximizing model fit is an
unsuitable approach to model selection.
To set these results into proper perspective, the three bar charts in Figure 3
break them down by the parameters varied in our 12 test types. The first chart
shows that FRscore scores highest on correctness at all noise ratios—by a
particularly large margin in high noise scenarios. While Conv0.75 and
Conv0.8 reach decent scores on fallacy-freeness even in the tests with 25
percent incompatible cases, they only find a correct model in, respectively,
20 percent and 12 percent of the trials, meaning that they mostly issue no
model at all, whereas FRscore still recovers a correct model in 40 percent of
the trials. At the same time, the most cautious approach, Conv0.8, which
typically abstains from drawing any causal inferences when processing the
most noisy data, avoids causal fallacies in 73 percent of the trials, while
FRscore only reaches 69 percent on fallacy-freeness. That is, in the tests
with 25 percent incompatible cases, FRscore comes with a slightly higher
false positive risk than Conv0.8, which, however, is counterbalanced by a
more than three times higher prospect of actually being rewarded by the
recovery of a correct model. While Conv0.8 has an advantage on complete-
ness in the tests with only 5 percent noise, the models selected by FRscore are
the most complete ones in all other tests.
The second chart in Figure 3 shows a similar edge of FRscore over the
other approaches as regard to correctness in all sample sizes. As is to be
expected, all benchmark scores are better in the larger sample sizes. MaxFit
is by far the most unreliable approach, in particular, in small-sized data:
While Conv0.75, Conv0.8, and FRscore avoid causal fallacies in over 70
percent of the trials, MaxFit misfires in half of the trials. Finally, the third
chart in Figure 3 plots the benchmarks against the complexity of D. These
results give rise to various questions. For instance, if D has two outcomes,
the scores on fallacy-freeness are significantly lower for all selection
approaches. That is, the complexity of the data-generating structure con-
siderably increases the false positive risk. At the same time, both Conv0.75
and FRscore have higher correctness scores if D has two outcomes. We do
not have explanations for either of these findings. They demonstrate that
the interdependence between the complexity of the data-generating struc-
ture and the reliability of corresponding CCM outputs is in need of further
scrutiny.
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Non-random Noise
Of course, cases incompatible with the data-generating structure may not be
equally probable. Certain types of measurement error may more frequently
occur than others or unmeasured variation of latent causes may confound the
data with a bias. In order to also assess the performance of FRscore in non-
random noise scenarios, we compare it with MaxFit, Conv0.8, and Conv0.75
in a second series of three additional classes of tests. Tests in class I are set up
analogously to our previous tests, that is, ground truths D are randomly
generated from the set of crisp-set factors F ¼ fA;B;C;D;E;Fg, and cases
in ideal data are replaced by cases incompatible with D. Now however,
incompatible cases are not selected with equal probability but such that 70
percent of them are identical. This shall simulate discovery contexts in which
certain types of measurement error are systematically repeated. In order for
this bias to be manifest in the data, we keep the ratio of incompatible cases
constant at 20 percent of the sample size. As before, we vary the number of
outcomes in D and the sample size multipliers, yielding a total of four test
types in class I (see Table 4).
Tests of classes II and III are set up differently. They do not simulate
noise due to measurement error but noise induced by an uncontrolled varia-
tion in latent causes. Instead of replacing cases in ideal data with incompa-
tible ones, we now draw ground truths and generate ideal data from which
we then eliminate columns corresponding to causally relevant factors. Tests
in classes II and III differ in the severity of the resulting data confounding. In
class II, ground truths are built from the factors in F with both one and two
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outcomes, and one randomly selected causally relevant factor is eliminated
from the data. In class III, we only generate two-outcome structures with at
least one common cause of those two outcomes; we then eliminate that
common cause from the data, which yields a strong spurious dependence
of the two outcomes. To ensure that the data contain causally irrelevant
factors on a regular basis, as in all the other test types, we add an additional
factor to the set from which ground truths are drawn:
F0 ¼ fA;B;C;D;E;F;Gg. As the tests in classes II and III merely eliminate
columns from ideal data without inserting any incompatible cases, varying
the sample size multiplier cannot yield data with varying difference-making
evidence.12 Hence, we keep the sample size multiplier constant in these two
test classes. Table 4 provides an overview over all seven test types of this
test series.
As before, we run 1,000 trials of each test type. The bar charts in Figure 4
plot the benchmark scores averaged over all trials in each test class. The
main finding is that FRscore only has a clear edge over the other selection
approaches in the tests of class I. While the systematicity of the measure-
ment error drags down the overall performance of CNA significantly (as it
would for any method), it still holds that FRscore selects a correct model in
50 percent of the trials, which is about twice as much as the other
approaches. Moreover, its models are most complete—although at a low
level of 15 percent—and it likewise avoids causal fallacies most frequently
(54 percent). But the low scores of all approaches on the fallacy-freeness
benchmark exhibit that systematic measurement error is not reliably
detected by CNA, which, as a result, misfires where it should abstain from
drawing any causal inference.
This changes in the tests of class II. Conv0.8 reliably detects noise
induced by a variation of latent causes and avoids causal fallacies in 92
percent of the trials—mostly by abstaining from drawing an inference.
Although beaten by Conv0.8 on fallacy-freeness, FRscore (62 percent)
scores better than the other approaches on correctness. When it comes
to completeness, MaxFit scores highest (20 percent). The results in the
tests of class III are similar, albeit at a significantly lower level. When a
common cause of two observed factors is unmeasured, Conv0.8 avoids
fallacies in 67 percent of the trials. But also in these tests, FRscore
scores highest on correctness (44 percent). While Conv0.75 (43 percent)
recovers almost as many correct models as FRscore, it outputs nearly
twice as many models per trial. Finally, there is a tie between Conv0.75
and FRscore on the completeness benchmark, both recovering 9 percent
of the ground truth, on average. The Online Appendix provides





























































Figure 4. Benchmark scores averaged over all trials in classes I (top), II (middle), and
III (bottom) of the non-random-noise series.
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additional plots breaking down those average scores by the varied
parameters.
Overall, while FRscore performs best on all benchmarks in the tests of
class I, it only scores higher than the other selection approaches on the
correctness benchmark in classes II and III. If there are varying latent causes,
there is a certain danger that FRscore is not cautious enough and produces
false positives that could be avoided by a more cautious selection approach
as Conv0.8.
Conclusion
This article has shown that maximizing consistency and coverage thresholds
in configurational causal modeling is a highly unreliable practice, even in the
presence of only mild degrees of noise. Maximizing model fit induces CCMs
to overfit at unacceptably high rates, which various critics of CCMs have
justifiably pointed out. The non-maximal threshold settings that have
evolved by convention over the years alleviate the overfitting danger con-
siderably—however, at the price of recovering data-generating structures
less completely than would be possible based on the available evidence
(i.e., underfitting) or of abstaining from drawing causal inferences altogether.
Overall, there is a clear need for complementing standard criteria of model fit
by further criteria of model selection.
To this end, we developed a criterion of fit-robustness which measures the
degree to which a model overlaps in its causal ascriptions with other models
inferred from re-analyzing data at systematically varied consistency and
coverage thresholds. The more overlap, the higher the (FR) score. We argued
that, contrary to robustness measures customary in statistical methods, which
reward model invariance, (FR) does justice to the fact that CCMs are
expressly built to mirror cross-case variation. (FR) allows for ample variation
among output models, as long as they are sub- or supermodels of one another
and, hence, do not make idiosyncratic causal ascriptions.
Contrary to recent robustness considerations in the methodological lit-
erature on CCMs, (FR) is straightforwardly computable based on the sub-
model relation, and we implemented it as an explicit R function. We
extensively benchmarked model selection based on (FR) in two test series,
one with random and one with non-random noise, comparing it to standard
approaches of model selection. If noise is randomly distributed, (FR) scor-
ing reduces the false positive risk by 5 to 22 percentage points, depending
on the alternative approach it is contrasted with, and it increases the
chances that a correct model—which is as complete about the ground truth
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as possible—is actually returned by 13 to 25 points. To top it off, this
maximization of correctness coupled with a minimization of the false pos-
itive risk is achieved while only issuing 1.38 models per trial, which
amounts to the lowest ambiguity ratio of all selection approaches. Hence,
if there is reason to assume that noise is randomly distributed, selecting
CCM models based on the measure of fit-robustness developed in this
article is unequivocally recommendable.
By contrast, in discovery contexts featuring non-randomly distributed
noise, for example, induced by systematic measurement error or confound-
ing, the overall performance of CCMs is so severely hampered that using a
standard selection approach, which cautiously abstains from drawing any
causal inferences if noise ratios are too high, might be the safer bet. But
even in non-random noise scenarios, analysts willing to take a risk are well
advised to select models based on the robustness measure developed in this
article because, although it does not minimize the false positive risk, it still
maximizes the chances of actually finding a correct model.
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Notes
1. For this inference to be valid, configurational comparative methods (CCMs)
assume that the data’s unmeasured causal background is homogeneous (Baum-
gartner and Thiem 2020).
2. A notable exception is Thiem (2014a), who conducts extensive data simulations
to determine how the choice of membership function and the anchoring of the
crossover threshold affect the coverage score of a single condition in fuzzy-set
QCA.
3. Thiem et al. (2016) have developed an interesting “method of combinatorial
computation” that calculates the probability that a conservative QCA solution
does not change under varying degrees of measurement error and data loss. But
on the one hand, that method is only applicable to parsimonious solutions with
some restrictions, and on the other, it does not tell us how the solutions change.
4. An expression is in disjunctive normal form if it is a disjunction of one or more
conjunctions of one or more literals (i.e., factors or their negations; see, e.g.,
Lemmon 1965:190).
5. Baumgartner and Thiem (2020) have moreover shown that data deficiencies as
limited diversity (fragmentation) or the inclusion of irrelevant factors in the
analysis do not increase the false positive risk.
6. None of QCA’s standard search strategies—conservative, intermediate, and par-
simonious—succeeds in finding (3); rather, QCA outputs model 1 in Table 1B at
all threshold settings in the interval ½0:75; 1. The reason, roughly, is that fit
thresholds are not authoritative for model building for QCA. By contrast, Dusa
(2018) has recently presented a promising new minimization algorithm for QCA
called CCubes that—analogously to CNA—treats fit thresholds as authoritative.
Correspondingly, CCubes succeeds in inferring (3) from Table 1A at h0:85; 1i.
7. Arel-Bundock (2019) has recently presented an extended Monte Carlo simulation
highlighting the overfitting danger for QCA. Note, however, that Arel-Bundock’s
results are not directly comparable to the ones reported below, as we measure
different benchmark criteria (for our reasons, see notes 10 and 11) and use a
different CCM.
8. See Arel-Bundock (2019) for a precise assessment of the degree to which (non-
maximal) conventional threshold placement alleviates the overfitting danger for
QCA.
9. In general terms, m is determined by the re-analysis type as follows:
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10. The disjunction of fallacy-freeness and correctness is equivalent to the correct-
ness criterion used by Baumgartner and Ambühl (2020) and Baumgartner and
Thiem (2020). Arel-Bundock (2019) introduces a quantitative wrongness cri-
terion, which amounts to the proportion of submodels of a CCM model that
are not submodels of the ground truth. We do not work with this measure
(nor its negation) here because we take it to be inadequate: It double-counts
logically dependent mistakes in models. To illustrate, assume that
AbDþ aBC $ E is the ground truth, and consider the incorrect models
(i) Aþ Bþ C $ E and (ii) AbDþ aBþ C $ E. Arel-Bundock’s criterion
yields a wrongness of 0.286 for (i) and of 0.326 for (ii), even though they both
make one and the same mistake, namely, to disjunctively instead of conjunc-
tively concatenate B and C. Since, apart from that, (ii) makes many more true
claims about the ground truth than (i), its wrongness score should be lower than
(i)’s.
11. Our completeness criterion is not equivalent to Arel-Bundock’s (2019) criterion
by the same name. Arel-Bundock defines completeness as the proportion of
submodels of the ground truth that are also submodels of a CCM model. That
is, for him, a model reaches perfect completeness irrespective of how many false
causal claims it entails, as long as it features all causal relations contained in the
ground truth. In our view, completeness should measure the amount of true things
we learn about the ground truth from the model. Hence, a model that is not true in
the first place cannot be complete, which is why only correct models can be
complete according to our completeness criterion.
12. For a more extensive explanation of why varying the sample size cannot affect
the performance scores in tests of classes II and III, see the Online Appendix.
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